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IN THE SUPRElVIE COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
PlainUff and Respondent,

v.

Criminal ·Case
No. 2926

KURT l\L LY.MAN,
Defendant and Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This action was brought by filing a Complaint in
the City Court of Provo City, Utah County, Utah. It
is charged in such Complaint:
That Kurt M. Lyman on or about the 15th day of
April, 1957, at Utah County, State of Utah, did commit
the crime of a felony, to wit: Embezzlement, committed
as follow, to wit: ''·That he, said K.urt M. Lyman, at
the time and place aforesaid did embezzle $12,000.00,
the property of the Lyman Finance Corporation of
Provo, Utah County, Utah, which said money had been
entrusted with said Kurt M. Lyman, an officer for said
Lyman Finance Corporation, and did appropriate the
same to his own use. " ( R. 4). A preliminary hearing
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was had on the charge contained in the Complaint, and
defendant was bound over to the District Court of Utah
County to answer the charge contained in the Complaint.
On August 23, 1957, an Information was filed in
the District Court of Utah County, wherein it is charged:
''Comes now Jackson B. Howard, District
Attorney of the Fourt Judicial District of the
State of Utah, and accuses Kurt :Jf. Lyman, he
having been bound over to answer to this charge
by a Committing )fagistrate, and charges that
the said Kurt :JL Lyman on or about the 15th
day of April, 1957, did commit the crime of a
felony, to 'vit: Embezzlement."
To the Information so filed, defendant, before entering a plea thereto, made and on September 6th filed in
the District Court the following instrument:
''Comes now Kurt M. Lyman, above named
defendant, and moves the ·Court to quash the
Information filed herein against the defendant
upon the following grounds and for the following
reasons:
1. That the Information fails to state a public
offense.
:2. That so far as appears from the Information

filed .against the defendant the charge therein
attempted to be alleged is not the offense
charged in the C01nplaint filed in the City
Court of Provo City, and, therefore, the attenlpted charge contained in the Information
11uty or 1nay not be the charge upon which
the defendant has had a preliminary hearing.
3. That the Infor1nation is so uncertain as to the
value of the alleged embezzlement that it can-
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not be determined whether the same was of
a value to constitute a felony or a misdemeanor.
4. That the Information does not inform the
defendant that which is charged to have been
embezzled belonged to some one other than
defendant.
''If the foregoing Motion to Quash the Information is not granted, defendant Kurt M. Lyman
moves the Court to furnish defendant with a Bill
of Particulars giving him the following information:
1. Who was the owner of the property claimed
to have been embezzled~

2. What was the kind of property that it is
claimed was embezzled~
3. What was the value of the property claimed
to have been embezzled~
4. For whose use is it claimed the property
was embezzled~
5. In whose possession was the property claimed
to have been embezzled~
6. With what intention is it claimed that the
defendant did the act with which he is
charged f'
The Court below denied the Motion to Quash, but
required the State to furnish a Bill of Particulars. Notwithstanding such requirement the District Attorney
failed to file a Bill of Particulars but the District Attorney did serve upon ·Counsel for defendant the following document :
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''Comes now' Jackson B. Howard, District
Attorney, and answers the Bill of Particulars submitted by defendant as follows:
1. The owner of the property claimed to have

been embezzled is the Lyman Finance Corporation.
2. The kind of property embezzled was money or
back exchange.
3. The value of the property embezzled was
$12,000.00.
4. Kurt

~I.

Lyman or Lyman :Jiotor Company.

5. The Lyman Finance Corporation.
6. With criminal intention, particularly the intent to fraudulently .appropriate to his own
use or to the use of some other person or
corporation moneys or credits which has come
into his possession by virtue of his trust as
an officer in the Lyman Finance Corporation." (R. 6)
The foregoing instrument so served upon Counsel
for defendant was not filed, but on the contrary, on
September 10, 1957, the District Attorney, without having
served a copy thereof on Counsel for defendant, was by
the Court permitted to file the following Amended Information:
· 'Comes now Jackson B. Howard, District
Attorney of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State of lTtah, and accuses l(urt :JL Ly1nan, he
having been bound over to answer this ch;:p-ge by
a Conunitting .l\lagistrate, and charges that the
said l(urt l\1. Lyman on or about the 15th day
of April, 1957, in Utah County did commit the
cri1ne of a felony, to wit: Embezzlernent, in that
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he did embezzle property in excess of $50.00 from
the Ly1nan Finance Corporation." (R. 8).
The defendant did not enter a plea to the Amended
Information. He went to trial thereon on the 16th day
of December, 1957.
Upon motion of Counsel for defendant a mistrial
was ordered because of improper statements made by
the District Attorney to the jury and the introduction
of improper evidence prejudicial to the defendant. (R.
11).
The case w,as again set down for trial, and a trial
had on the 16th of December, 1957, which resulted in
the jury being unable to agree upon a verdict, there
being seven for acquittal and one for conviction (R. 33).
The case was again tried on the lOth day of February, 1958, which trial resulted in .a verdict of guilty
(R. 58).
A Motion in Arrest of Judgment was made by the
defendant and the same denied (R. 59).
A 1\lotion for a New Trial was also made and
denied ( R. 61).
On February 20, 1958, defendant was sentenced, and
the sentence suspended, subject to the same being
amended ( R. 62). Notice of Appeal was served and
filed on April 15, 1958.
It is from the judgment of sentence that this appeal
is prosecuted.
Defendant seeks a reversal of the judgment appealed
from on .account of claimed error committed during the
course of the trial in the following particulars :
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ASSIGNMENT OR POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO QUASH
THE INFORMATION. (R. 59-72)
Af-:;SIGN~1EXT

OR POINT II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE
STATE OF UTAH TO FILE ITS AMENDED INFORMATION.
(R. 72)
.

ASSIGX:JIEXT OR POIXT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE EXHIBITS B AND C. (Tr. 18)
ASSIGX:JIE~T

OR POINT IV.

THE TRIAL ·COURT ERRED IN PER:\IITTING THE
WITNESS PAUL BLACK, TO ANSWER THE QUESTION:
WAS THERE ANY AUTHORIZATION MADE TO MR. LYMAN, OR TO ANY OTHER PERSON, BY THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS, AUTHORIZING THE PAY:\IENT FOR SOMETHING OTHER THAN FLOORING OR CONTRACTS. (Tr. 24)

ASSIGX:JIEXT OR POIXT V.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO STRIKE
THE EVIDENCE OF MR. BLACK THAT FERDINAND
ERICKSON WAS A DIRECTOR OF THE LYMAN MOTOR
COMPANY. (Tr. 28)

ASSIGN:JIEXT OR POINT VI.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING MR.
BLA·CK OVER THE OBJECTIONS OF COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT TO TESTIFY THAT WHEN HE AND MR. HAR1\ION TOOK OVER THE l\IANAGEMENT OF THE LYMAN
MOTOR COMPANY THERE WAS IN EXCESS OF $5,000.00
OVERDRAFT AT THE BANK. (TR. 34) AND TO FURTHER
TESTIFY AS TO THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF THE
LYMAN MOTOR COMPANY. (Tr. 36-7)
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ASSIGNMENT OR POINT VII.
(

·'<

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING MR.
BLACK TO TESTIFY OVER OBJECTION OF COUNSEL FOR
DEFENDANT THAT DEFENDANT WAS OWING TO THE
LYMAN MOTOR COMPANY IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF
$800.00. (Tr. 68)

ASSIGNMENT OR POINT VIII.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING EXHIBIT
J TO BE RECEIVED IN EVIDENCE OVER THE OBJECTION OF COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT. (Tr. 72)

ASSIGNMEXT OR POINT IX.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO STRIKE
THE STATEMENT OF MR. CARLISLE WHILE TESTIFYING
FOR THE PLAINTIFF THAT THE SITUATION WAS BEYOND THE STAGE OF BEING CONTRACTS, AND WERE
OF A CRIMINAL NATURE. (Tr. 88-89)

ASSIGNMENT OR POINT X.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE
DISTRICT ATTORNEY, OVER OBJECTION OF COUNSEL
FOR DEFENDANT, UNDER THE GUISE OF CROSS-EXAMINATION TO INTERROGATE THE DEFENDANT AS
TO ·CERTAIN CHECKS MADE OUT BY VARIOUS PERSONS
TO VARIOUS OTHER PERSONS. (Tr. 196-204)

ASSIGNMENT OR POINT XI.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY AS REQUESTED IN REQUEST BY
DEFENDANT IN HIS REQUEST NO. 1.

ASSIGNMENT OR POINT XII.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY AS REQUESTED IN REQUEST NO. 2.
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ASSIGNMENT OR POINT XIII.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY AS REQUESTED BY DEFENDANT IN
HIS REQUEST NO. 4.

ASSIGNMEN·T OR POINT XIV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE
THE JURY AS REQUESTED BY DEFENDANT IN HIS
REQUEST NO. 5·, AND IN GIVING IN LIEU THEREOF
INSTRUCTION NO. 5, AND PARTICULARLY THAT PORTION OF INSTRUCTION NO. 5 WHEREIN THE JURY WAS
INSTRUCTED TO THE EFFEoCT THAT A PERSON IS
GUILTY OF EMBEZZLING PROPERTY WHETHER THE
PERSON DERIVES ANY BENEFIT HIMSELF FROM THE
TRANSACTION, OR WHETHER OR NOT HE INTENDS
TO RETURN THE MONEY OR OTHER PROPERTY TAKEN
AT SOME LATER TIME, OR TO MAKE RESTITUTION TO
ITS RIGHTFUL OWNER.

ASSIGNMENT OR POINT XV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE
TO THE JURY APPELLANT'S REQUEST NO. 8.
ASSIGN~fENT

OR POIXT XYI.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS NINTH
INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY, AND IN PARTICULARLY
THAT PORTION OF SUCH INSTRUCTION WHICH IGNORES
THE FACT THAT THE ARTICLES OF IN.CORPORATION
OF LYMAN FINANCE CORPORATION EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED THE LOANING OF ITS MONEY.

ASSIGNl\!IEXT OR POIXT XYII.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN ARREST OF JUDGMENT.

ASSIGN11ENT OR

POI~T

XYIII.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT A NEW TRIAL.
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ARGUMENT
ASSIGNMENTS OR POINTS I, II, and XI
ASSIGNlVIENT OR POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO QUASH
THE INFORMATION. (R. 59-72)

ASSIGNMENT OR POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE
STATE OF UTAH TO FILE ITS AMENDED INFORMATION.
(R. 72)

ASSIGNl\lENT OR POINT XI.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY AS REQUESTED IN REQUEST BY
DEFENDANT IN HIS REQUEST NO. 1.
THE ERRORS vVHICH APPELLANT CLAIMS WERE
.COMMITTED BY REASON OF POINTS OR ASSIGNMENTS
I, II AND XI, IN THE MAIN, INVOLVED THE SAME QUESTION OF LAW, AND THEREFORE, WE SHALL DISCUSS
SUCH ASSIGNMENTS OR POINTS TOGETHER.

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 77-23-3, provides that a
Motion to Quash an Information shall be available on
one or more of the following grounds :
1 (b)

That the court has ordered a bill of particulars under the provisions of Section
77-21-9 and the prosecuting attorney fails
to furnish a sufficient bill.

2(a)

That an information was filed without the
defendant first having had or waived a
preliminary examination.

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 77-21-6, provides for the
form of an information in this language:
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"X.Y. the district attorney for the ___________________ _
district accuses A.B. of (here charge the offense
in one of the ways mentioned in section 77 -21-8-e.g.
murder, assault with intent to kill, poisoning an
animal contrary to section 76-5-12 of the Penal
Code) and charges that (here the particulars of
offense may be added with a view to avoiding the
necessity for a bill of particulars)."

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 77-21-8, provides that
an information is valid and sufficient if it charges the
offense for which defendant is being prosecuted in one
or more of the following ways:
"(a) By using the name given to the offense
by the common law or by a statute.
(b) By stating so much of the definiting of the

offense, either in terms of the common law
or of the statute defining the offense or
in terms of substantially the same meaning, as is sufficient to give the court and
the defendant notice of what offense is
intended to be charged.
(2) The information may refer to a section or
subsection of any statute creating the offense charged therein, and in determining
the validity or sufficiency of such information or indictn1ent regard shall be had to
such reference.''

The provisions of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 76-511, referred to in the form of .an infonnation is of
little or no aid in detennining the sufficiency of the
information in this case.
E1nbezzlen1ent is thus defined in Utalz Code Amwtated, 1953, 76-17-1:
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"Embezzlmnent is the fraudulent appropriation of property by a person to whom it has
been intrusted.''

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 76-17-2, provides that:
''Every officer, director, trustee, clerk, servant or .agent of any association, society or corporation, public or private, who fraudulently appropriates to any use or purpose not in the due
and lawful execution of his trust any property
which he has in his possession or under his
control by virtue of his trust, or secretes the
same with a fraudulent intent to appropriate it
to such use or purpose, is guilty of embezzlement."

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 76-17-3, provides:
"That a carrier or other person having personal property for transportation is guilty of
embezzlement if such property is fraudulently
appropriated to a use other than for its safe
keeping.''

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 76-17-4, makes it the
crime of embezzlement for a bank, trustee, merchant,
broker, attorney, agent, assignee in trust, executor, administrator, collector, or other person having control of
personal property guilty of embezzlement if he fraudulently appropriates the same to a use other than the
lawful execution of his trust.
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 76-17-5, contains similar
provisions as to a bailee, servant, attorney-in-fact, etc.
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 76-17-6, contains a similar provision as to a bank officer or employee.
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Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 76-17-7, provides that:
''Every clerk, agent or servant of any person
who fraudulently appropriates to his own use or
secretes with a fraudulent intent to appropriate to
his own use any property of another which has
come into his control or care by virtue of his
employment as such clerk, agent or servant, is
guilty of embezzlement.''
It will be seen that in the complaint filed in the
City Court upon which the defendant had his preliminary hearing, and upon which he was bound over to the
District Court, he was charged with having appropriated
$12,000.00 to his own use. It will also be seen that in
the original information filed in the District Court the
defendant was merely charged with having committed
the crime of embezzlement. In compliance ·with the demand for a Bill of Particulars defendant was informed
that he had appropriated either money or bank exchange,
either to his own use, or to the use of the Lyinan ~lotor
Company. That defendant had the intention of fraudulently appropriating the 1noney to his own use or to
the use of some other person or corporation, money or
credit which had con1e into his possession by virtue of
his trust as an officer of Ly1nan Finance Corporation.
Contrary to the require1nents of U.C.A. 1953, ?7-21-9, the
Bill of Particulars w.as not filed of record. That thereafter the State was pennitted to file an Amended Information in whieh defendant was charged with having
committed the crime of embezzling property in excess
of $50.00 fr01n the Ly1nan Financ-e Corporation (R. 8).
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It was upon the Amended Information that defendant
went to trial. It will be seen that by U.C.A., 1953, 77-21-9
a new Bill of Particulars shall supersede any previous
bill. Apparently it was sought by the Amended Information to supercede the Bill of Particulars and by that
means deprive the defendant of all definite information
of the charge he was required to answer.
This Court is committed to the following propositions of law:
1. That one charged with a crime may be bound over
to the District Court to answer only to the charge
contained in the Complaint filed before the Committing Magistrate, and upon which he has been
given a preliminary hearing, unless such preliminary hearing, with consent of the State, is waived,
or of an offense necessarily included within the
charged offense.
Among the cases so holding are State v. Pay, 45 Utah
411, 146 Pac. 300; State v. Freeman, 93 Utah 125, 71 Pac.
(2d) 196; State v. Jensen, 103 Utah 478, 136 Pac. (2d)
949.
It is said in the case of State v. Woolman, 84 Utah 23,
33 Pac. (2d) 640, that:
'' ]1--,or lesser offense to be necessarily included
in greater offense within statute permitting connection of offense charged, the lesser offense
must of necessity be embraced within legal definition of greater offense .and be part therof. ''
2. While the short form of an information such as
that provided for in U.C.A. 1953, 77-21-8, has been
held not to offend against the provisions of Article One, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah
wherein it is provided that in criminal prosecu-
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tion the accused has a right to demand the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, none-theless one charged with a crime is entitled to the
benefits of such constitional provision.
State v. HiJll, 3 Utah 334, 3 Pac. 75. State v. Jensen,
98 Utah 482, 100 Pac. (2d) 969; State v. Hale, 71 Utah
134, 263 Pac. 86; State v. Spencer, 101 Utah 281, 121
Pac. 912.
While a Bill of Particulars is not a part of an inforInation, however, the granting thereof is not discretionary, but is a matter of right if the statutory conditions
are present. State v. Solomon, 93 Utah 70, 71 Pac. (2d)
104.
So, also, is it the settled law in this jurisdiction that
the sufficiency or insufficiency of an information must
be tested by its allegations and not by the evidence introduced at the trial. State v. Fisher, 79 Utah 115, 8 Pac.
(2d) 589; Ballm:ne, et al. v. DV8trict Court of F~rst Judicial District for Box Elder County, et. al., 107 Utah 247,
133 Pac. (2d) 265; State v. Solomon, supra.
It will be seen that the cmnplaint filed. before the
committing magistrate did inforn1 the defendant of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, namely:
of having rnis.appropriated to his own use the sum of
$12,000.00 belonging to Lyn1an Finance Cmnpany. For
some unknown reason the original infonnation rnerely
charged that ](urt ~L Lyrnan cmnn1itted the crime of
ernbezzlernent on or about ~\pril15. 1957. That information is t>ntirely silent as to whose property ·was misappropriated, the nature or the an1ount thereof, for

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
whose use and benefit the same was appropriated, or the
provision of the Utah Statutes that were offended
against. It may here be noted that the crime of embezzlement did not exist at common law, 18 Arn. Jur. 571.
It would seem clear that since the information utterly
failed to give defendant the necessary information to
enable him to defend against the same, that, therefore,
he was entitled to a Bill of Particulars.
We assumed that when the Bill of Particulars was
ordered and .a copy thereof was served upon Counsel,
the original was filed in the cause as by law provided.
It was not until this appeal was prosecuted that Counsel
'for defendant learned that the proposed Bill of Particulars had not been so filed. Apparently Counsel for the
State sought to escape being bound by the Bill of Par. ticulars by filing the Amended Information. It would
seem obvious that the defendant may not thus be denied
his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation he is called upon to defend
against.
Moreover, the Amended Information upon which defendant was tried is about as vague and uncertain as it
could have been drawn within the charge contained in the
Complaint upon which he was charged in the Complaint
filed in the City Court and upon which he had a preliminary hearing, and upon which he was bound over to the
District ·Court. Such information was calculated to keep
defendant in the dark .as to the particulars of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him. He was merely
informed that he was charged with having embezzled
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property in excess of $50.00 from the Lyman Finance
Corporation. Under such allegation the evidence offered
by the State as to issuance of three separate checks by
defendant was received in evidence, one of such checks
was for $12,000.00, one for $246.97, and one for $1753.03.
Such checks were marked P-C, D and H. (Trs. 78-21)
It seems clear that if the issuance of either of the
three above Inentioned checks constitute an offense, the
issuance of each constituted a separate offense. \Ve
have a statute, U.C ..A. 1953, 77-21-31, 'vhich provides
that the information must charge but one offense. If
in this case an information may be drawn in such
vague and uncertain language as to bring within such
language a number of claimed offenses, and if, as was
done in this case, the three checks were properly received in evidence, then and under such circumstances
the provisions of U.C ..A. 1953, 77-21-31, are circuvented.
That is to say, if by the use of vague and uncertain
language broad enough to coYer two for 1nore claimed
offenses, the accused is required to guess as to the
particular acts he is called upon to answer, and if at
the trial evidence is offered .as to nwre than one offense, then and under such circmnstances accused is
called upon to answer 1nore than one offense as effectively as if he had been charged with n1ore than one
offense. Indeed, if an infonnation nmy be drawn by the
use of vague and uncertain language so as to permit
evidence of nwre than one offense, then and in such
a case that kind of an infonnation is fraught with a
greater invasion of the rights of the aceused than if
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he had been openly charged with more than one offense. See State v. Beck, 85 Utah 531, 39 Pac. (2d) 1091.
The trial court as a part of its instruction to the
jury stated that the particular property charged to have
been embezzled is money of the Lyman Finance Company
in the sum of $12,000.00 made payable to the Carlisle
Corporation and signed Lyman Finance Corporation
by Kurt M. Lyrnan, President. However, such language
did not inform the jury that the inforn1ation was limited in its charge to the item of $12,000.00, nor is the
information limited to such a charge, nor was the evidence limited to such a charge, nor w.as the verdict of
the jury lirnited to the itern of $12,000.00. The verdict of
the jury is that defendant is guilty as charged.
A principle of law of uniform application is that
the purpose to be accomplished by an information and
a verdict of .a jury rendered after the trial is threefold,
namely: ( 1) To inform the defendant of the nature and
cause of the a0cusation filed against him; (2) To inform
the court of the nature and cause of the accusation
.against the defendant about to be tried; (3) To enable
defendant, or other person to determine just what has
been deterrnined by the verdict.
It may be inquired: Was the defendant found
guilty of the crime of issuing the check for $12,000.00,
or the chek for $246.97, or the check for $1753.03 ~ No
answer to such inquiry can be found in the evidence or
in the verdict of the jury. But little aid in giving an
answer to such inquiry can be found by re.ading the
instructions of the Court to the jury. All that may be
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said of such instructions is that the issuing of the
$12,000.00 check is included in the charge.
As heretofore stated, defendant was charged in the
Complaint filed in the City Court of Provo with having
appropriated the $12,000.00 to his own a0count. There
is not a scintilla of evidence showing or tending to show
that Kurt M. Lyman received anything belonging to
the Lyman Finance Company for his personal use. The
evidence is all to the contrary. (Trs. 29, 67 -222)
It will he noted from the provisions ·of our statute
dealing with Embezzlement that such crime may be
committed in a number of different ways, one of which
is by appropriating money to one's own use. Indeed,
when one is charged with the crime of embezzlement
the usual understanding is that the accused has taken
money or property belonging to another and appropriated the same to his own use. That is ,,-hat defendant
is charged with having done. There is a vast distinction between the act of a president of one corporation
using money belonging to such corporation to aid another corporation of which he is president, and the act
of an officer of a corporation appropriating the money
of such a corporation for his personal use. In the former case that may well be lacking moral turpitude. In the
latter case uwral turpitude is of the very essence of
the act.
It is, to say the least, Yery doubtful if one reading
the Cmnplaint filed before the City Court could reasonably anticipate that he would be ·called upon to defend
an .ad of using the n1oney of one corporation to pay

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
the obligations of another. If the Complaint filed in
the City Court may be so eonstrued, then and in such
case, the Complaint is calculated to deceive rather than
to inform defendant of the nature of the acts he is
c.alled upon to defend against. Nor may it be said that
the act of using the money of one eorporation to pay
the debts of another corporation is included in the
charge of appropriating money to one's own use. The
State Legislature did not deem the one means of committing an act of embezzlement included with the other
acts which constitute that offense. As will be seen from
the v.arious sections of the Act defining embezzlement
above quoted, that the Legislature specifically designates the acts which -constitute embezzlement. When the
infonnations were filed in the District Court we know
of no reaon why the defendant should not have been
informed of the specific act, or the sections which it
is claimed the defendant offended ag.ainst, unless it
were to keep the defendant in the dark as to particular
acts with which he was charged. Nor is there any good
reason ·why the State should not have filed a Bill of
Particulars as by law required, instead of substituting
therefor the Amended Information with its vague and
uncertain language which may be s.aid to include a
number of acts which fall within the meaning of the
language of such Amended Information.
It is said in 18 Am. Jur., Sec. 43, page 598, that:
"If there are sever.al sections of the statute
concerning embezzlement which describe different
phases of the crime by designating different per-
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sons, different property, etc., an indictment must
be drawn under the proper section. Even where
the difference involves only the relation in which
the person stood who committed the offense, the
one does not include the other, and a defendant
indicted under one statute cannot be convicted of
the offense disclosed by the other.''
While our Code of Criminal Procedure provides f,or
the amendment of an information, there is no provision
therein which permits the destruction of a Bill of Particulars by resort to the filing of an An1ended Information, yet that is what is done in this case. So far as the
record shows a Bill of Particulars was not filed, but in
lieu thereof there was filed an Amended Information.
If that may be done, then the right of defendant to a Bill
of Particulars is rendered meaningless. As heretofore
pointed out, the evidence shows without conflict that the
appellant did not appropriate any of the funds of the
Lyman _b-,inance Corporation to his ~own use, but devoted
a substantial portion of his ti1ne in attending to the business of such Con1pany without being paid anything for
his services. That being so, he was entitled to have the
jury bring in ,a verdict of Not Guilty as requested in his
Request No. 1, and by the sarne token he was entitled to
have granted his :Motion in Arrest of J udg1nent.
ASSIGNl\fENT OR POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE EXHIBITS B AND C. (Tr. 18)

The court 1nay experience s01ne difficulty in deterInining the partieular Exhibits to which Assign1nent or
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Point III relates. That is due to the fact that there were
three trials had in the court below with the result that
some of the Exhibits bear more than on exhibit number.
Exhibit B, however, contains but one identification as an
exhibit. It is a check for $6000.00 drawn by Paul C.
Black for and on behalf of the Lyman Finance Corporation. So far as is made to appear appellant had nothing
whatever to do with the execution of that check. It was
apparently offered in evidence for the purpose of showing that appellant was responsible for the action of Paul
C. Black, the Secretrtry and Treasurer of the Lyman
Finance Corporation. ( Tr. 11) If anyone was guilty of
misapplying the money represented by the $6000.00
check, it was Paul C. Black and not appellant. Exhibit C
is the stub of the check Exhibit B. What has been said
about Exhibit B applies to Exhibit C. Neither of those
exhibits had anything to do with the charge here lodged
against appellant, especially the charge contained in the
Complaint filed in the City Court of Provo.
ASSIGNMENT OR POINT IV.
THE TRIAL .COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE
WITNESS PAUL BLACK, TO ANSWER THE QUESTION:
WAS THERE ANY AUTHORIZATION MADE TO MR. LYMAN, OR TO ANY OTHER PERSON, BY THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS, AUTHORIZING THE PAYMENT FOR SOMETHING OTHER THAN FLOORING OR CONTRACTS. ('Tr. 24)

It is, of course, elementary law that the best evidence
of what the Board of Directors do is contained in its
Minutes. At no time was Mr. Black asked about the
Minutes of the Board of Directors. By the answer the
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witness was permitted to express his own conclusion.
Moreover, it is to say the least, doubtful if the action
of the Bo.ard of Directors was material in that if the appellant was guilty of the crime of embezzlement by what
was done, the Board of Directors was without authority
to authorize what is clain1ed was done by defendant. \re
shall have more to say .about this phase of the case later
in this Brief.
ASSIGNMEXT OR POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO STRIKE
THE EVIDENCE OF MR. BLACK THAT FERDINAND
ERICKSON WAS A DIRECTOR OF THE LYMAN MOTOR
COMPANY. (Tr. 28)

It is the law of Utah that before one can be a director
of a eompany he must, among other things, take an oath
of office. Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 1{;-:l-8, Schwab 't:.
Trisco Min. and A1ill. Co., 21 Utah 238, 60 Pac. 940. Later
Mr. Erickson was called and testified to the effect that
he did not take an oath of office. ( Tr. 145) The only
reason that we can conceive for offering the e"\idence that
Mr. Erickson was a director of the Lyman 1\:fotor Conlpany was to justify the actions of ::\Ir. Erickson and
Black in convincing appellant that .Jlr. Erickson and .Jlr.
Bl.ack, together with Rulon Snow, should take oyer the
business of Lyman .Motor Con1pany. (Tr. 149) They did
take over the business, ( Tr. 30-33), atten1pted to amend
the A.rticle8 of Incorporation, (Tr. 60-61), succeeded in
getting appellant to ~urrender the power to yote his
stock, (Tr. 61}, and after operating the business for about
a nwnth the~· caused a suit to be brought by the Lym.an

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23
Finance Corporation and attached all of the assets of
Lyman Motor Company. (Tr. 37) The testimony that
.Mr. Erickson was a director of the Lyman Motor Company could not have any relevancy to the question of
whether or not appellant was guilty of the crime of
ewbezzlement, and was calculated to confuse the jury
and cast upon .appellant a suspicion of wrongdoing not
connected with such crime.
ASSIG~MENT

OR POINT VI.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING MR.
BLACK OVER THE OBJECTIONS OF COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT TO TESTIFY THAT WHEN HE AND MR. HARMON TOOK OVER THE MANAGEMENT OF THE LYMAN
MOTOR COMPANY THERE WAS IN EXCESS OF $5,000.00
OVERDRAFT AT THE BANK. (TR. 34) AND TO FURTHER
TESTIFY AS TO THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF THE
LYMAN MOTOR COMPANY. (Tr. 36-7)

The evidence of the overdraft of the funds of Lyman
.Jiotor Company is foreign to any issue in this case . .Nor
is there any evidence that appellant was responsible for
the overdraft, or the financial condition of that Company.
The admission of this and considerable similar inoompe:.
tent evidence was clearly calculated to mislead the jury
as to the matter of whether or not the defendant w.as
guilty of embezzlement.
As we understand the law, the guilt or innocence of
an accused of the crime of embezzlement does not depend
upon the amount of assets or liabilities owned by a corporation whose funds are being disposed of.
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ASSIGNMENT OR POINT VII.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING MR.
BLACK TO TESTIFY OVER OBJECTION OF COUNSEL FOR
DEFENDANT THAT DEFENDANT WAS OWING TO THE
LYMAN MOTOR COMPANY IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF
$800.00. (Tr. 68)

•

It would indeed be enlightening to kno·w upon what
theory such evidence is material in this case. Can it be
said that because appellant was indebted to Lyman .Jiotor
Company in the neighborhood of $800.00, that, therefore,
he was guilty of embezzlement of some rnoney frorn the
Lyman Finance Corporation~ \Vas the Bill of Particulars
abandoned by failing to file the same and the vague and
uncertain Arnended Information filed so that the jury
might find that defendant was guilty of embezzlement
because he owed the Lyman l\I,otor Con1pany in the
neighborhood of $800.00, which money in turn belonged
to Lyman Finance Corporation~ It is safe to say that no
authority can be found that will support the admissibility of such evidence, on any such a theory. or any
other theory. The evidence was calculated to prejudice
appellant in the rninds of the jury.
ASSIG N:J[ENT OR POIXT YIII.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERl\IITTING EXHIBIT
J TO BE REtCEIVED IN EVIDENCE OVER THE OBJECTION OF COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT. (Tr. 72)

Exhibit J is an application directed to the Utah
State Securitie~ Cornrnission for pennission to sell stock
to the public in Lyman Finance Corporation. It will be
seen that the application provides, arnong other things,
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that Paul C. Black, a Certified Public Accountant licensed in the States of Utah, Nevada and Texas, was
the Secretary-Treasurer and General Manager of Lyman
1!--,inance Corporation, and was to receive $600.00 per
month salary, and that $300.00 per month was to be paid
to the Lyman Motor, Inc., for office space .and facilities,
together with telephone and clerical services. The application provides that the proceeds from the sale of these
securities will be used in financing of autmnobile conditional sales contracts with contr.acts for insurance
premiums thereon. Source of such Conditional Sales
Contracts is through Lyman M~otor, Inc., a Utah Corporation, of which Kurt M. Lyman owns the controlling
capital stock. There is no evidence which shows or tends
to show that on February 28, 1957, it w:as not the bona
fide intention of appellant to carry out the objects n1entioned in the application, and if there can be found in
this record evidence to the contrary, the admission of
the Exhibit for that reason is inadmissable in evidence.
The application is in no sense a part of the crime of
embezzlement. If appellant is guilty of the crime of embezzlement, it is because of what he did without regard
as to whether there was or was not an application made
for the sale of stock in Lyman Finance Corporation. The
admission of the Exhibit in evidence \Vas prejudicial to
defendant, in that, it carries an inference that some of the
money derived from the sale of stock in Lyman Finance
Corporation was not used for the purposes specifically
mentioned in the application. Later in this Brief we
shall direct the attention of the Court to the provisions
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of the Articles of Incorporation of Lyman Finance Corporation which should be eonsidered in connection with
the above mentioned application.
ASSIGNMENT OR POINT IX.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO STRIKE
THE STATEMENT OF MR. CARLISLE WHILE TESTIFYING
FOR THE PLAINTIFF THAT THE SITUATION WAS BEYOND THE STAGE OF BEING CONTRACTS, AND WERE
OF A CRIMINAL NATURE. (Tr. 88-89)

Generally the expression of an opinion is limited
to expert witnesses and even then such witnesses are nol
permitted to give testimony as to matters not requiring
special knowledge or questions of law. By refusing to
strike the testimony as requested by appellant the jury
may well have believed that the Court approved the
statement of the witness that the acts concerning ·which
testimony was being given were of crin1inal nature.
ASSIGNMENT OR POINT X.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE
DISTRICT ATTORNEY, OVER OBJECTION OF COUNSEL
FOR DEFENDANT, UNDER THE GUISE OF CROSS-EXAMINATION TO INTERROGATE THE DEFENDANT AS
TO ·CERTAIN CHECKS MADE OUT BY VARIOUS PERSONS
TO VARIOUS OTHER PERSONS. (Tr. 196-204)

During the course of the introduction of evidence
on behalf of the prosecution, the District Attorney called
the attention of the Court and jury to checks which he
clairned were drawn on four different banks throughout
the Stat<' of Utah on aeeonnh; in the nan1es of H. \Vill1elm,
l\1ary Lyman, George ~\lhert and Bradshaw. (Tr. 31-3~)
A hearing wa~ had before the Court in the absence of the
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jury as to the adrnissibility of the checks claimed to have
been n1ade out to :.Merlin Bradshaw, H. Wilhelm, George
Albert and :Mary Lyman, which the District Attorney
claimed constituted an unlawful operation of check kiting.
The trial court held that the checks were not proper
evidence. (Trs. 97-98) Notwithstanding the ruling of the
Court in such particular, and notwithstanding appellant
was not examined concerning such checks on his direct
examination, the District Attorney on cross-examination
was, over objection of Counsel for. appellant, permitted
to cross-examine appellant .at considerable length concerning such checks. ( Tr. 212-213) No claim was made
that the checks were signed by appellant. Indeed, the
District Attorney admitted that all of the checks, except
one, were signed by the bookkeeper. While the checks
were again rejected by the Court, it is clear that the
exhibiting of these checks before the jury was irnproper
and calculated to prejudice the jury against the defendant. Such action is expressly condemned by this Court in
the case of State v. Lanos, 63 Utah 151, 223 P.ac. 1065.
ASSIGNMENT OR POINT XII.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY AS REQUESTED IN REQUEST NO. 2.
(R. 5'5)

In his Request No. 2 defendant requested the Court
to instruct the jury thus:
''You are instructed, .Members of the Jury,
that the defendant is charged with having appropriJated the sum of $12,000.00, the property
of Lyman F~nance Corporation to his own use.
Before you can f~nd the defendant guilty ~n this
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case you must find beyond a reasonable doubt
that he did appropriate the $12,000.00 to his own
use, a;ncl m this connect~on you are ~nstructed that
even if you should find that he appropriated the
$12,000.00 to the use of Lyman il!otor Company,
you cannot find him guilty of the crime charged,
and your L·erdict must be not guilty.''
Much of what has heretofore been said applies to
this Assign1nent or Point. rrhere is this additional observation. The Amended Inf.ormation being so vague .and
uncertain as to the particular acts with which appellant
is charged, in fairness to appellant the gener.al language
of such information should in any event be li1nited to the
charge contained in the Cmnplaint filed in the City
Court, otherwise appellant 1nay not be said to have been
informed of ''the nature and cause of the accusation
against him'' as provided in Article 1, Sectiou 12 of the
Constitution of Utah.
ASSIGNMENT OR POIXT XIII.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY AS REQUESTED BY DEFENDANT IN
HIS REQUEST NO. 4.

In his request No. 4 appellant 1nade this request:

''You are instructed that the defendant is
not charged with any offen~e growing out of any
contract or other dealings whereby Carlisle Finance Cmnpany adYanced 1noney to Lyn1an Motor
Company, and, therefore, the defendant is not
ealled upon in this proceeding to justify his
aetions in such a transaction, and even if you
~hould believe that defendant wa~ guilty of improper]~· selling· purported contracts of L~'lnan
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l\Lotor Cornpany to the Carlisle Finance Company,
such fact, if it be .a fact, will not support a conviction of the charge here made against the defendant, in other words, the only matter you are
called upon to determine in this cause is whether
or not the defendant is guilty of the particular
crime of embezzling the sum of $12,000.00 of the
Lym.an Finance Corporation.'' (R. 56)
It will be seen that the trial court marked the Request just quoted as having been given. (R. 56) However,
the same was not given .as will be seen from the instruchons of the Court to the jury. (R. 36 to 54) In this connection it may be noted that the record fails to show that
an exception was taken to the failure of the Court to give
Request No. 4. Counsel for appellant does not now recall
whether or not he relied upon the notation of the Court
that the request w.as given. Be that as it may, it seems
from the provisions ~of Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
77-37-4, that when written requests to a charge have been
presented the question presented in such requests need
not be expected to, and any error in the decision of the
Court theron may be taken advantage of on appe.al.
This Court has apparently construed such section in
the following cases. People v. Berlt"'n, 10 Utah 39, 36 Pac.
199; State v. Cooper, 114 U. 531, 201 Pac. (2d) 764, citing
State v. Anderson, 75 Utah 496, 286 Pac. 645. In the
Berltn case supra it was held that no exception need be
taken in order that advantage may be taken on appeal.
In the Cooper case supra the contrary view seems to
have been taken. Neither in the Cooper or Anderson
cases is the statutory provision mentioned. In light of
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the clear language of the statute above referred to it
would seem apparent that this Court overlooked the
same.
A reading of the evidence in this case will show that
the entire case was based upon the claim that appellant
paid the $12,000.00 check, together with the check for
$1753.00 and for $246.97, to the Carlisle Corporation
for invalid contracts that had theretofore been sold by
the Lyman Motor Company to Carlisle Corporation. (See
testimony of witness Albert Zenger, (Tr. 81 to 96), and
cross examination of appellant..Much of the same was
objected to by Counsel for appellant. (Tr. 187 to 217)
·Considerable of the cross examination exceeded the
bounds of propriety, such as these questions asked appellant on cross-exa1nination:

"Q.

Do you want to take the Fifth ...-hnendment~
Do you think that will inerilninate you if you
tell1ne why it isn't fraudulent '?n

Q.

They are all bogus contracts, either no car
or no person?" (Tr. 193 to 2:2:2)
Notwithstanding the vagueness and uncertainity of the
language of the Amended Information, it probably \vill
not be contended that the giving of the cheeks to the
Carlisle Corporation are offenses charged by the Amended Information. It may be even open to doubt as to
whether or not the evidenee of the transaction had
wherein the Ly1nan :Motor Company received m·oney from
the Carlisle Corporation was c01npetent evidence, in that,
such tran~aetions were in no sense .a part of the charge
filed against appellant. It is apparent under the theory
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of the State the guilt of appellant was not dependent
upon whether or not the trans.actions had whereby the
Lyman .Motor Company acquired money from the Carlisle
Corporation, but upon whether or not appellant had a
right to issue the Carlisle Corporation the check or
checks in payment of the money owing by the Motor
·company to Carlisle Corporation. Be that as it may, in
light of the copious testimony about the transactions
had between the Motor Company and .C.arlisle Corporation, the jury might well have believed that such transactions were of controlling importance and appellant
was entitled to the requested instruction. It m.ay be noted
that at the trial which resulted in the jury being unable
to agree upon a verdict, the Court gave the Requested Instruction No. 4. ( R. 24)
ASSIGNMENT OR POINT XIV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE
THE JURY AS REQUESTED BY DEFENDANT IN HIS
REQUEST NO. 5·, AND IN GIVING IN LIEU THEREOF
INSTRUCTION NO. 5, AND PARTICULARLY THAT PORTION OF INSTRUCTION NO. 5 WHEREIN THE JURY WAS
INSTRUCTED TO THE EFFECT THAT A PERSON IS
GUILTY OF EMBEZZLING PROPERTY WHETHER THE
PERSON DERIVES ANY BENEFIT HIMSELF FROM THE
TRANSACTION, OR WHETHER OR NOT HE INTENDS
TO RETURN THE MONEY OR OTHER PROPERTY TAKEN
AT SOME LATER TIME, OR TO MAKE RESTITUTION TO
ITS RIGHTFUL OWNER.

In order to understand appellant's objection to
Court's Instructi~on No. 5, it is necessary to have in mind
these facts :
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Mr. Black was a Certified Public Accountant with
authority to practice his profession in Utah, Nevada and
Texas. He was the Secretary-Treasurer, General Manager and a director of the Lyman Finance Corporation.
See Exhibit J. He drew the Articles of Incorporation of
the Lyman Finance Corporation by having the same
copied fron1 the Articles of the Lyman :Motor Company.
(Tr. 38-39) Among the powers of the Lyman Finance
Corporation as contained in its Articles of Incorporation
were these:
''To acquire, sell, and otherwise dispose of,
deal in stocks, bonds, n1ortgages, securities, notes
and connnercial paper of corporations and individuals, to act as agents for insurance cmnpanies
of Utah and receive applications for fire, casualty,
plate glass, boiler, elevat·or, accident health,
burglary, Inarine life insurance, all other kinds of
insurance and collection of premiu1ns, and to do
such other business as 1nay be delegated by agents
for such con1panies, and to conduct a general insurance brokerage business, to lend n1oney and
negotiate loans.
''To acquire by purchase or othenYise, own,
hold, lease, rent, 1nortgage .and otherwise to trade
with and deal in real estate, lands and interest in
lands and all other property of every kind and nature.
''To borrow 1noneY and to execute notes and
obligations and security contracts therefore, and
to lend any of the nwneys or funds of the corporation and to take evidence of indebtedness
therefore." (Tr. 39 to 42)
Paul Black received a salary of $600.00 per n1onth,
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which was paid from funds of Lyman ~lotor Company,
together with other expenses of the Lyman Finance Corporation (Tr. 75). While 1\lr. Black subscribed for stock
in the Lpnan Finance Company and agreed to pay
$3,000.00, no part of which he paid, notwithstanding, he
verified the Articles of Incorporation of such Corporahon, stating that not less than ten per cent of the stock
of the Corporation had been paid ( Tr. 45-46). When it
was first planned to form the Lyman Finance Company
the same was to be .a 1nere branch of the LYJ.llan ~Iotor
Company. Mr. Erickson, a lawyer who assisted in the
sale of stock in LYJ.llan Finance Corporation, so testified
(Tr. 143). The two companies occupied the same offices
and the rent was paid by the Motor Comp.any (Tr. 47).
See also Exhibit J. Thus from the time of the organization of LYJ.llan Finance Corporation the two con1panies
had substantially the same powers as evidenced by their
Articles of Incorpor.ation. For the most part their officers were the same, and their funds were used to pay
the debts of the corporations without regard to source of
such funds. It is apparent that the financial interests of
the two companies were so comingled that the two companies \vere treated as one corporation. So far as appears,
no one objected to this manner of doing business until it
was thought that the Motor Company was in financial
trouble, when some of the stockholders of the Finance
Corporation, particularly Mr. Black .and Mr. Erickson,
conceived the idea of attaching all of the assets of the
.Motor Company for the use and benefit of the Finance
Corporation. In this connection it should be observed
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that appellant did not keep the books of either of the
two companies (Tr. 47-48). But that work was done
by Mr. Horst Schwermer, who for a short time was
succeeded by Rosa Maycock, (Tr. 103), who in turn \Yas
succeeded by Paul Black (Tr. 49). The authorities as
we read them te.ach that under such a state of facts
one may not be said to be guilty of embezzlement. Such
being the law, the trial court's Instruction No. 5 is erroneous. In light of the fact that the obligations of the
Finance Corporation had been paid by funds of the
Motor Company, it may not be said th.at appellant was
guilty of embezzlement when he used some of the money
of the Finance Corporation to pay debts of the J\1otor
Company, especially if appellant intended that the Finance Corporation would in due time be reimbursed for
any excess of its money used for that purpose.
ASSIGXniEXT OR POIXT XY.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE
TO THE JURY APPELLANT'S REQUEST NO. 8. (Tr. 239)

By his request No. 8 .appellant requested the Court
to instruct the jury
''that the Articles of Incorporation of the
Lyn1an Finance Corporation authorized the defendant, Kurt M. Lyman, to loan the n1oney of
the Ly1nan Finance Corporation to the Ly1nan
Motor Company, and to borrow~ on behalf of the
Ly1nan Finance Corporation, 1noney fr01n the Carlisle Finance C01npany. ''
The attention of the Court is again directed to the
provisions of the Articles of Incorporation of the Finance
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Corporation which provides that such Corporation shall
have power:
''To borrow money and to execute notes and
obligations and security contracts therefor, and
to lend any of the money or funds of the Corporation and to take evidence of indebtedness therefor." (Tr. 42)
The evidence is all to the effect that appellant exercised
the general supervisory powers over both the Motor
and Finance Corporations. Indeed, the prosecution seems
to have proceeded on the theory that the appellant was
responsible for all that was done by the two corporations.
During the course of the trial the prosecution apparently
took the view that it was of controlling importance because there was written on the stubs of the checks that
were paid to the Carlisle Corporation for Flooring. Such
notation was made on the stub of the check executed
by Paul C. Black. The evidence further shows without
conflict that the money paid to Carlisle Corporation was
carried on the books of the Motor and Finance Companies
under the heading of Flooring, and that at the time the
checks were given Horst Schwermer was the bookkeeper
of the Motor Company (Tr. 172). The fact that the word
flooring was written on the stub of the checks given
to Carlisle Corporation did not have the effect of relieving the Motor Company from the obligation to pay
the Finance Corporation for the money that was paid
to Carlisle Company. At most, the transferring of Contracts to Carlisle Corporation w.as merely as security for
the payment of an1ounts advanced by Carlisle Corporation in the transactions. The evidence so shows (Tr. 58).
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Generally speaking an officer of a corporation who loans
its rnoney is not guilty of embezzlement. 10 American
and English Encyclopedia of Law 995.
ASSIGNMENT OR POINT XVI.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS NINTH
INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY, AND IN PARTICULARLY
THAT PORTION OF SUCH INSTRUCTION WHICH IGNORES
THE FACT THAT THE ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION
OF LYMAN FINANCE CORPORATION EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED THE LOANING OF ITS MONEY.

:Much of what has been said under the foregoing
Assignment or Point XV applies to Point XVI. It will
be seen that such Instruction in effect permits a jury
to find a person guilty of embezzlement if he is negligent
in conducting the affairs of a corporation. It is also
stated that a president of a corporation has only the
powers of a director, or such additional powers as may
be directly conferred upon him by the Board of Directors,
or by the Articles of Incorporation. As we have heretofore directed to the attention of the Court, the Articles
of Incorporation of Lyman Finance Corporation expressly authorized the loaning of its rnoney. The lmv
as to the authority of the president of a corporation is
thus stated in 13 Am. Jur. page 878. Sec. 898:
"\Yithin the scope of his duties as head of
the corporation and in the perforrnance of all acts
of an ordinary nature which rnay fairly be deemed
incidental to the .adrninistration of the office he
holds, the president rnay act without the direct
or special authority of directors.''
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So also is it said in Section 897, page 876, that
"Irrespective of the inherent powers of the
president there can be no doubt that the board of
directors may invest the president with authority
to act as chief executive officer of the company.
This may be done either by .an express resolution
or by acquiescence in course of dealing."
Xumerouse cases are cited in footnotes which support
the text.
The evidence in this case clearly shows that the
Board of Directors acquiesced in appellant conducting
the business of the two corporations without any expressed restrictions being placed thereon. Indeed, if appellant was without authority to pay the Carlisle .Corporation money belonging to Lyman Finance Corporation, the Board of Directors were without such authority.
In its Instruction No. Nine the jury were further
told that
''A person who negotiates a transaction between two corporations, as an officer and agent
of each of them, is required by law to act in
fairness to each and to disclose to each facts
which he knows or should know would reasonably
affect the judgment of each in such transactions.''
By the portion of Instruction No. Nine just quoted, the
jury were apparently called upon to determine whether
or not appellant acted fairly when he used the Inoney of
the Finance Corporation to pay the obligation of the
Motor Comp.any. Doubtless, the stockholders of the .Motor
Company would approve the acts of appellant, if by
doing as was done in this case, the Motor Company
could be saved from being forced out of business.
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Instruction nu1nbered Nine, when viewed either as
a whole or by its separate p.aragraph is calculated to
permit the jury to find defendant guilty of embezzleInent unless his actions in advancing the money to Carlisle Corporation measures up to each and all of the
requirements mentioned in that instruction. \Ve have
been unable to find any authority in support of such
view and would be surprised if Counsel for the State
will be more successful in finding any such authority.
ASSIGNMENT OR POINT XVII.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN ARREST OF JUDGMENT.

In addition to what has heretofore been said under
our discussion of Assignments or Points I, II and XI,
the authorities are to the effect that one is not guilty of
the offense of embezzlen1ent when the property or 1noney
embezzled or a part thereof belongs to the person or
corporation to whom or to which it belongs. In this
case the evidence without conflict shows that the 1noney
or a substantial part of the money of the Finance Corporation that was p,aid to Carlisle Corporation to pay
the obligation of the .Motor Company actually belonged
to the Motor Company....~s heretofore pointed out, the
money of the Motor Company was used to pay the salary
of Mr. Black while e1nployed by and rendering serYice
for the Finance Corporation, and also to pay the rent
of the Finance Corporation. \Yhile the mnount of 1noney
of the Finance Corporation that was used to pay the obligation of the l\Iotor C01npany apparently exceeded the
an1ount owing hy the Finance Corporation to the .Jlotor
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Company, such fact under the authorities does not support a conviction for embezzlement especially where as
here the funds of the two companies were comingled,
and appellant, so far as appears, was not familiar with
just how the accounts of the two Lyman companies stood
with respect to each other. Bishop on Criminal Law,
Xinth Ed., Vol. 2, page 288, Sec. 343, 10 Amer. & Eng.
Ency. of Lau', 995, and cases cited in footnotes. See also
18 Am. Jur. 580 and cases of State vs. White, 46 Idaho
124, 266 Pac. 413; State vs. Clayton, 80 Utah 557; 15
Pac. 2d 1057.
ASSIGNMENT OR POINT XVIII.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT A NEW TRIAL.

As to this Assignment, appellant adopts the claimed
errors heretofore discussed as the basis for a new trial
in the event the Motion in Arrest of Judgment should
not have been granted.
Appellant prays that the judgment be reversed, and
that this Court directs the court below to dismiss the
action and discharge appellant.
Respectfully submitted,
ELIAS HANSEN,
Attorney for Appellant
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